Donate NowVanessa Gezari, for the Pulitzer Center
Journalist Vanessa Gezari answers your questions about her story on the Human Terrain program in Afghanistan for The Washington Post Magazine. She writes from Helmand Province, where she is embedded with a Human Terrain team attached to the Marines. Comments and questions for Gezari are marked in italics.
Vanessa, I enjoyed the article, thank you. I also enjoyed reading the comments, which contained many interesting points.
Given that U.S. policy appears committed to staying in Afghanistan, I think the U.S. military should consider multiple options for improving its ability to protect its troops, counter the Taliban, and provide
security for local Afghans. I understand how other posters have reached the conclusion that those goals are unattainable, and that is certainly a very important strategic discussion. However, the U.S. military is conducting what it has deemed a counterinsurgency, and I think we can discuss the conduct of that counterinsurgency independent of the broader strategic discussion.
Like many of the other posters, I would like to know more about the background of the program, the hiring of the program members, and the alleged difficulty in finding members with knowledge of Afghanistan. Mr. Rosen suggested that as a bare minimum the program members should receive several months of intensive language training. The U.S. military does have a formal lessons learned process; one can only hope that the military intends to provide that training in the future. Mr. Rosen pointed out that officers with common sense should be able to figure out for themselves many of the things that the Human Terrain members will be looking at. Undoubtedly. Countless articles suggest that officers, soldiers, and marines developed an excellent understanding of Iraqi sectarian and tribal workings. However, officers, soldiers, and marines must also plan operations, look after their troops, and fight. My guess is that they would welcome assistance from individuals with at least some formal training, be it in anthropology, tribalism, or conflict resolution, who can devote all of their energy to focusing on the problem at hand and providing candid suggestions to decision makers. Of course if the soldiers feel the human terrain members' presence is a dangerous distraction or unproductive, that should be addressed in the article or future articles.
Generals Petraeus and McChrystal (sp?) appear intent on pursuing a strategy of counterinsurgency focused on attempting to secure areas and sponsor development. Mr. Rosen may well be right that this will not work. In the meantime, I'm glad that the U.S. military is looking at multiple options for assisting the soldiers in their efforts.
Posted by: SB | September 01, 2009 at 12:01 AM
Thanks for your comment and questions. I think I've addressed some of them – about training, selection, etc. – above. In terms of language skills, again, I agree with you and Nir. If I were running the Human Terrain project, I'd put team members through intensive language training from the minute they arrived in Leavenworth. That would require deciding early where people would actually be deployed, which would be an advantage for many other reasons as well. This has also been a problem in the military at large: they train someone in Pashto and his unit gets deployed to Iraq. It's the same in HTS. They get their country assignments early, but in Afghanistan, whether you're going to the south or somewhere else determines what language you should learn. Some people have told me they didn't know exactly where they were going until a week before they left.
You're right in what you say about soldiers and Marines. Some have great skill with people and seem made for counterinsurgency. I've seen bright young officers build rapports with Afghans and watched them struggle to make sense of the complexities of this place the way any intelligent stranger would. Others just don't have it in them, and many of the younger ones aren't trained or otherwise prepared for it. Many soldiers and commanders I've talked to really like having someone along whose job it is to ask questions about economics, politics or agriculture because as you say, commanders and patrol leaders have a lot to think about, and this gives them some breathing space. There are also probably some who think this kind of thing is ridiculous, and that there shouldn't be a bunch of civilians out there who the soldiers have to protect, though I haven't heard this expressed nearly as much.
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The following comments and questions are from Shaun McCanna, Pulitzer Center journalist who reported from Afghanistan on poppy farming (watch video: http://www.pulitzercenter.org/openitem.cfm?id=912 and the government's effort to develop a primary education system (read Shaun's blogs from Afghanistan on education:
http://pulitzercenter.typepad.com/untold_stories/afghanistan-education-in-peril/
"I was in Kandahar in June and met with the Provincial Education Director. They have had about 90 schools destroyed by the Taliban in the last few years, but never a school that had been built in part
with local village involvement—partially paid for and built by the villages, or land and materials being donated by them. Does the Human Terrain project seek similar local involvement/investment in potential projects? You mentioned the Canadian's were working on a similar initiative, but
it seemed to be a surprise to the American team? Is there no international cooperation and planning when it comes to this and similar programs? Do you think there should be?"
Posted by: Pulitzer Center | September 01, 2009 at 11:03 AM
Hi Shaun, Were any of the schools in Kandahar built through the National Solidarity Program? I think that program involves local community development councils in both determining the needs of the
village and perhaps building the projects. I'm not an expert on the NSP, so if someone knows more about it, please feel free to pitch in.
In answer to your question, I haven't seen evidence that the Human Terrain project seeks local involvement in development projects like schools, though I think lots of team members would support that concept. There's a constant conversation among the teams and troops I've spent time with about how to make Afghan lives better without perpetuating the idea of an international welfare state in the form of coalition troops. But I don't think many good answers have surfaced yet.
I'll be spending some time with the Canadians soon, so I hope to learn more about their cooperation with US forces. I think they do try to cooperate when the left hand knows what the right hand is doing, but often each side is focused on its own projects. There should be more cooperation on development, but this is a longstanding problem in Afghanistan, where so many nations are represented, each with its own political agenda, lingo and way of thinking. As I understand it, there have been some very basic technical communication problems between the Americans and Canadians as well as bigger issues having to do with strategy, messaging, etc. Its also true that the Canadians have been working in some of the most difficult parts of the south for years with little recognition from the American public, and this can't feel good to Canadian soldiers, no matter how good the relationship between commanders on both sides.